Three Obstacles to the Taliban's Long Term Governance

Whispers is an intelligence and analysis column focused on post-democratic Afghanistan

Three Obstacles to the Taliban's Long Term Governance

“The coup was necessary because of Guinea's deep despair amidst rampant poverty and corruption.”

– Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, President of Guinea 2008-10

CONTEXT

There is often euphoria when a government changes hands. This seems to be true in cases of coup d’états, forcible takeovers, and in morally bankrupt abdications of support (e.g. the NATO-led Afghanistan withdrawal). The new stewards assume the reins of authority with grand proclamations and heady promises about health, wealth, unity, and a new moral heading for a nation. The populace, having little recourse, is often swept up in nationalistic fervor.  Grievances against the old regime are remembered and, for a moment, there is hope that maybe the new boss will be better than the old one.

But what happens when the promises are broken and the euphoria subsides?

DISCUSSION

Governing is hard.

Appeals to piety and continual references to scripture do little to stabilize an economy or prop-up a health system. The work is made doubly hard when 50% of the population is no longer allowed to participate in society due to their gender. Afghanistan is learning that semi-literate mujahadeen make poor substitutes for skilled professionals and trained civil servants.

The honeymoon is over for the Taliban. Defections at senior levels have begun, the façade of unity has been smashed, and factionalism has diverted the Taliban into two factions (Kandahari and Haqqani). The blindingly foolish decision to revoke education for girls betrayed trust among the international community. Early supporters of the regime have been forced to reevaluate their relations due to the threat posed by terror groups operating openly in the country.

In short, the Taliban failed the governance test and appear to be on a downward trajectory. The adherence to purely theocratic principles of governance for a nation with difficult access to markets, a disappearing middle-class, and centuries old ethnic divisions will eventually evolve into a period of stagnation.

Afghanistan lacks an Ataturk-like figure with the will and intellect to continue the secular progress made over the previous two decades. The Mullahs and their lackeys inspire very few. The moderates who initially held sway have been shown to the door in favor of the hardliners and warlords with ministerial titles.

It is difficult to say whether the growing insurgency can unseat the Taliban, which is certainly the unspoken hope of many in the international community.

Perhaps there is a challenger in their midst. Unlike their previous reign, where the Taliban did not face the remnants of a professional army and intelligence apparatus, times have changed. Perhaps the former members of the Afghan Army, Police, and Ministry of the Interior can effectively challenge the Taliban.

But even if a challenger defeats the Taliban, would the world simply play witness to another honeymoon period of proclamations and grandiose platitudes? As near as we can tell, the insurgents have limited goals and seem to be fighting to establish autonomous regions within Afghanistan. The resistance suffers from the same lack of inspired leadership that the Taliban faces.

ANALYSIS

Our analysis indicates the prognosis is not favorable for the Taliban’s efforts to establish any semblance of reasonable governance in the near term. The Taliban face three primary obstacles in this regard:

• An active insurgency that is well-armed, well-financed, and continues to achieve battlefield success.

• An internal split between Haqqani and Kandahari factions that is creating distrust and is proving to be divisive on policy decisions.

• A potential economic collapse, which would further erode public confidence and make the job of governing nearly impossible.

JMH