A Festering Wound for China: The Uyghur East Turkestan Movement (ETIM)
A Festering Wound for China: The Uyghur East Turkestan Movement (ETIM)
CONTEXT
The primary concern of regional stakeholders since the Taliban takeover has been to prevent the spread of extremism and the accompanying blight of terrorism. Buried underneath all the disingenuous proclamations of support for the regime lies a deep suspicion the Taliban are offering safe havens for select terrorist groups. While Pakistan remains the biggest and most immediate target, China knows it lies squarely in the crosshairs of the Uyghur East Turkestan Movement (ETIM).
DISCUSSION
“The Afghan Taliban will never allow any force to use the Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China.”
– Abdul Baradar, Taliban Spokesman 28 July 2021
China was one of the first major state actors to meet with the Taliban. The first public meeting took place in Tianjin, China prior to the US withdrawal. The meeting was considered important enough that Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, met personally with the Taliban delegation. One of the primary topics discussed was ETIM. Minister Yi implored the Taliban to refuse cooperation with the group as they represented a “…direct threat to China’s national security…”. In an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on 17 August 2021 China again sounded the alarm about Afghanistan becoming a haven for terrorist groups. In nearly every subsequent meeting, China has managed to include references to terrorism. Clearly, Beijing has deep concerns about ETIM and the internationally embarrassing treatment of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang province.
ETIM Reorganization and Consolidation
There has been a reported leadership change within the ETIM in Afghanistan. Sheikh Abu Dar Da Uyghury has reportedly replaced Abdul Haq. Little is known about the new leader, but sources indicate he has strong organizational skills and has pressed for quicker action than his predecessor. He arrived from Pakistan nearly a month ago and is accompanied by an entourage of 24 ETIM commanders and bodyguards. He is believed to be staying as a guest of Qari Fassihuddin in Kabul and his mandate is to extend the ETIM network throughout Afghanistan.
Over the past three months, several high-profile ETIM leaders and footsoldiers began arriving in Afghanistan. We have confirmed the arrivals of: Qari Ali, Sheikh Anas, Qari Shakir, Qari Azhar, Farhad (full name unknown), Omar Tajik, Khodabakhsh (full name unknown), Affan (full name unknown), Lotfollah (full name unknown), Sheikh Hafez, Qari Hisham, Haji Salman Uyghury (full name unknown), Habib (full name unknown), Mustafa Uyghur, Salamatullah (full name unknown), Dr. Saleh Uyghur, Bashir (full name unknown), Jalandar (full name unknown), Safullah (full name unknown), CODENAME “a Caravan”, Mihrab (full name unknown), Sajjad (full name unknown), Ali Karwan, Salahuddin(full name unknown).
The ETIM personnel are dispersed between Kabul and Badakhshan province currently and many are known to be guests of Taliban leaders and residing in their residences.
Material Support
Sources indicate that ETIM has hired buyers to purchase weapons for their forces. American weapons are in demand and the purchases are made from the Taliban in places such as a depot near Abdul Alim’s home in the village of Zu Dare Khostak. Sources indicate the group has been buying weapons since December 2021 and were previously reported to be developing a biological weapon in a sectioned off laboratory at American University of Kabul University in February 2022.
ANALYSIS
It is nearly inconceivable to think China has not received intelligence on ETIM activities in Afghanistan. We believe the continued references to “terrorism” in diplomatic engagements are meant to telegraph this knowledge to Taliban leaders. Presumably, they have developed and implemented strategies to counter any terrorism activities that may emanate from within Afghanistan. However, their early support for the Taliban creates a significant diplomatic impasse should an attack occur in Xinjiang.
Our analysis indicates the Chinese will continue to hold talks with the Taliban and will continue with investment in projects already underway (primarily in the mining sector). We also believe China will continue to dangle large scale infrastructure investments in front of the Taliban (and the international community) but will withhold committing funds until the Taliban deal decisively with the ETIM problem. We do not believe the Taliban will challenge the ETIM groups in Afghanistan.
Ultimately, the situation represents a “festering wound” that will disrupt cooperation between the two countries and may hasten a diplomatic withdrawal of China. Russia, already fearful of terrorism threats to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, would likely follow suit and the Taliban would lose the support of the only major voices it has on the world stage.
JMH